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The rise of China, India, and other Asian nations is creating 
a new «core» of the world economy centered on the Pacific. It 
is essential for the United States to remain vigorously engaged 
in this region, yet the climate of our relations with Asian part-
ners is cooling. The United States and Asia2 have yet to find 
a way to cooperate effectively on any significant global issue. 
This dilemma, we argue, requires urgent attention on both 
sides of the Pacific, and specifically a U.S. strategy that features 
innovative civil diplomacy alongside official initiatives.
The Challenge
Asia already accounts for about half of the world’s people 
and nearly a quarter of its output and financial assets (figures 
1 Publicado en East-West Dialogue, Nº1, septiembre de 2007. Repro-
ducido con la debida autorización del East-West Center, Honolulu.
2 We use the term Asia to refer to Asian countries that vigorously 
participate in the global economy, including most countries in Nor-
theast and Southeast Asia and India.
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1 and 2). Over the past forty years, all of the world’s fastest 
growing economies (those with per capita income growth of 5 
percent or more) were Asian, and China, India, and Vietnam 
are topping global growth charts today. This unprecedented 
«Asian miracle» has lifted hundreds of millions of people from 
poverty to middle- and even upper-income lifestyles.
And the miracle continues. The region has recovered 
forcefully from the financial crisis of 1997-98, and its future 
progress is ensured by investments in physical assets and edu-
cation (figures 3 and 4) that already exceed those of the United 
States. Asia’s share of world output doubled in the last 50 
figure #1: World Output:
Shares of GDP at market exchange rates, 2005 and 2020
data source: asian development bank
figure #2: World Wealth:
Shares of gross financial stocks, 2005 and 2020
data source: mckinsey global authors projections
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years and will probably double again in the next 50. We need 
to prepare for a world in which Asia will overtake the United 
States in many important aggregate economic measures.
Given these remarkable trends, the United States and Asia 
share a vital stake in Asia’s peaceful rise. It is essential that Asia’s 
major powers and the United States become, in the words of 
World Bank President Robert Zoellick, «responsible stakehol-
ders» in a stable, prosperous world order. The United States 
still has great influence in shaping this order, but time is limited. 
We need to make sure that strong, cooperative institutions 
emerge, and that the United States itself is firmly established as 
an attractive model and trusted partner for Asia.
figure #3: World Investment:
Shares of gross domestic capital formation, 2005 and 2020
data source: asian development bank and authors projections
figure #4: University Students:
Shares of terciary enrollment, 2005 and 2020
data source: UNESCO and authors projections
UNITED
STATES ASIA
REST 
OF THE 
WORLD
2020
2005
UNITED STATES
ASIA
REST 
OF THE 
WORLD
2020
2005
148
Estudios Internacionales 159 (2008) • Universidad de Chile
Yet for now, the chemistry of the Asia-U.S. relationship is 
failing. While recent relations among governments have been 
positive, public attitudes have soured. This may be due to the 
anxieties of economic competition, which find voice in sensa-
tionalist press reports and the politicization of complex trade 
and currency issues. The results are harmful: a recent BBC 
poll found that America’s «influence in the world» is viewed 
positively by only 28 percent of Chinese and 37 percent of 
other Asians, while China’s influence is viewed positively by 
only 34 percent of Americans and 43 percent of other Asians. 
And the positive opinions are decreasing.
The public climate is cooling despite the fact that the Uni-
ted States currently enjoys its best official relations ever with 
China, Japan, and India. It engages these countries at many 
levels including the top leadership. Asian countries, in turn, 
have been pragmatic and collaborative in their relations with 
the United States — by being more willing than Europeans, 
for example, to set aside their reservations about U.S. Middle 
East policies in direct relationships.
Renewing the American Partnership with Asia
What is lacking is a coherent vision for the trans-Pacific 
relationship, built on an equal partnership of the United States 
and major Asian countries, and implemented through mutually 
valued collaborative initiatives. This cannot be accomplished 
through bilateral relationships, or through regional institution 
building in Asia. A strong trans-Pacific framework, we believe, 
would strengthen not only U.S. connections with Asia but also 
the Asian region’s ability to cooperate internally.
The United States has been and remains a key driver of 
economic growth in Asia. This is due in part to policies that 
reduced barriers to economic interaction, and in very large part 
to a myriad of business and personal decisions on investments 
in and imports from Asia. U.S. military assets and alliances in 
the region have been also widely regarded as stabilizing.
The post-Cold-War efforts of the United States to refashion 
its relations with Asia Pacific countries crystallized in 1989 
in its participation in launching the Asia Pacific Economic 
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Cooperation (APEC) forum. President Clinton later helped 
to elevate APEC to the leaders’ level, and the forum then see-
med destined to become a principal element of a new global 
architecture. But APEC’s effectiveness weakened with the 
over-expansion of its membership and disappointments in its 
economic results — both in trade liberalization and in han-
dling the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, APEC remains 
the most logical vehicle for regionwide cooperation. As we 
argue below, it should remain central to America’s strategy 
for the Asia Pacific partnership.
False Choices
Since the financial crisis, Asian countries have shown re-
newed interest in narrower regional institutions of economic 
cooperation. Alternatives include ASEAN+3 (which China 
supports, since it is likely to play a leading role in it), and 
ASEAN+6 (which Japan supports, expecting Australia, New 
Zealand, and India to dilute China’s influence). The United 
States has not opposed these groupings, as it had the East 
Asia Economic Group in the early 1990s, but APEC remains 
its preferred regional economic architecture.
These arrangements are often viewed as stark alternatives 
in competition with each other. But the view that integration 
has to be either Asian-only or Pacific-wide presents a false 
choice. Each has advantages. They can be maximized when 
both are pursued in parallel.
Intra-Asian integration is desirable because it can facilitate 
the region’s rapidly deepening economic connections. Asian 
integration has been accelerated also by the political reper-
cussions of the Asian financial crisis. The crisis demonstrated 
the region’s financial interdependence and highlighted the 
absence of an adequate regional framework for handling 
regional emergencies.
Trans-Pacific ties are at least as important. Asian trade, 
while reflecting extensive intra-Asian exchanges in production, 
is still largely targeted on final demand outside the region, 
especially in the United States. U.S. capital markets help to 
intermediate Asian savings, and U.S. firms invest heavily and 
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productively in Asia. The United States also remains an es-
sential source of technology and of assets attractive to Asian 
investors. The same relationships, viewed in reverse, show 
how interdependence benefits the United States.
The United States cannot expect Asia to choose between 
regional integration and Pacific integration, much as it would 
refuse to choose between the North American Free Trade Agre-
ement (NAFTA) and relations with Asia. On their side, Asians 
cannot neglect their commercial and political stakes in North 
America. In today’s global economy, regional integration is 
best understood as a means for strengthening a region’s global 
competitiveness: it is a complement to, and not a substitute 
for, broader partnerships.
Improving the Chemistry of Asia-U.S. Relations
We would prefer to see parallel regional and trans-Pacific 
trade agreements and a successful conclusion to the Doha 
Round. We would also like to see the U.S. government play 
a prominent role in rebuilding the Asian partnership. But we 
recognize that these outcomes are not in the political cards for 
now. In fact, the U.S. government may have its hands full just 
defending and building its relations with China and securing 
approval of the free trade agreement with South Korea. So 
what can be done?
First, strategic planning. There is important, quiet work to 
be done by governments in building a vision for an Asia-U.S. 
policy, to be implemented as political opportunities permit. 
Some key elements are already in place. On the political 
side, these include the U.S. alliance system, the Senior Policy 
Dialogue with China, and the Six Party Talks. In economics, 
there are APEC and the Strategic Economic Dialogue with 
China. But these institutions have been created ad hoc; they 
cover neither the region as a whole, nor all critical issues. A 
thoughtful framework is needed, identifying all important in-
teractions and channels for addressing them. The channels do 
not have to be formal, but they should involve senior officials 
and, as appropriate, people outside government, and should 
have adequate resource and analytical support.
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Second, regional institutions. Since APEC is the centerpiece 
of the American multilateral relationship with the region, the 
United States needs to give it greater and more consistent empha-
sis. APEC’s proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, 
however compelling it may be in the long run, is not likely to gain 
traction for a variety of reasons, including the fact that Congress 
has failed to renew the President’s trade-negotiating authority. 
APEC needs realistic goals leading to successes. Its mission should 
be sharpened to cooperation on significant, shared policy interests 
on both sides of the Pacific. For example, APEC could do valuable 
work in areas such as health and safety, trade facilitation, energy 
conservation, financial integration, and educational and cultural 
exchange. But its products must be well defined, substantial, and 
recognized as important. APEC should never again allow a major 
regional economic issue, like the Asian financial crisis, to occur 
without vigorously addressing it.
To make APEC more effective, the United States needs 
to upgrade its investment in it and engage broad segments 
of society in the forum’s efforts. In addition to APEC, the 
Asian Development Bank, with a Pacific-wide membership, 
substantial resources, and a mission that targets knowledge-
based work and regional integration, should also get more 
attention in Washington.
Third, public diplomacy. Given the constraints on govern-
ment action, public diplomacy should assume a large role in 
sustaining the Pacific Partnership. We could usefully borrow a 
page from China’s playbook and launch a U.S. «charm offen-
sive» in Asia. The emphasis should be on civil institutions — 
America’s highly regarded business, cultural, and educational 
assets. This will require some seed funding from government. 
The United States has gained handsomely from such efforts 
in the past –for example, leaders around the world have been 
familiarized with U.S. perspectives through the Fulbright 
program– yet it has consistently underfunded them. This is 
no time to be shortsighted, given Asia’s trajectory and the po-
tential costs of a breakdown in the relationship. Further, good 
programs will be inevitably leveraged by the private sector, 
provided that they are free of public interference.
These steps will not be easy to implement, nor will they 
quickly eliminate tensions. But the vision of a world economy 
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led by Asia and the United States as collegial partners makes 
the effort enormously worthwhile. This new publication — the 
East-West Dialogue — is a contribution to that effort. Our 
goal in this and future issues is to generate a lively exchange 
on Asia-U.S. issues and, in the process, help build bridges 
across the Pacific.
The Other Deficit
The United States has one of the lowest ratios of «outward 
student mobility» (0.2%) in the world. In 2005, approxima-
tely 590,000 foreign students enrolled in higher education in 
the United States, but only 190,000 Americans were studying 
abroad. Flows are also sharply imbalanced by region. For 
each American student in Asia, 20 Asians come to the United 
States. Most Americans go to Europe. There are good reasons 
for imbalances –the strength of American universities and 
the rich cultural assets of Europe quickly come to mind– but 
increased American exposure to Asian countries would be an 
obvious plus for civil diplomacy.
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Commentaries
APEC’s Moment of Opportunity
Taeho Bark, Presidente de la Korea International Trade 
Commission; Decano, Escuela de Postgrado, Universidad 
Nacional de Seúl.
East Asian countries began to enter into regional trade 
agreements (RTAs) relatively late. Although they have been 
expanding such agreements since the late 1990s, their shift 
toward regionalism has failed thus far to catch the attention 
of the world economic community. Most intraregional agree-
ments have been «shallow» in scope and depth, whereas more 
of the trade agreements concluded by the outward-looking 
East Asian countries have been interregional. 
Since Korea completed its negotiations for a free trade 
agreement (FTA) with the United States and started negotia-
tions with the European Union, both China and Japan have 
shown a great deal of interest in starting FTA negotiations 
with South Korea. In South Korea, some advocate a Northeast 
Asian FTA, with all three countries participating. After China, 
Japan, and South Korea concluded their respective bilateral 
FTAs with ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), 
some are even suggesting an ASEAN+3 FTA (including Japan, 
South Korea, and China).
Several factors make an East Asian RTA unlikely: ASEAN 
countries are at different stages of economic development. 
South Korea, China, and Japan are still divided by sensitive 
historic, political, and economic issues. China and Japan are 
still wary of each other in the competition for leadership within 
East Asia. Finally, for East Asian countries, interregional trade 
is still more important than intraregional trade, and therefore 
the need for an East Asian RTA is not felt very acutely. 
For the time being, the dialogue will be pursued along two 
separate tracks simultaneously –the negotiations for inter– and 
intraregional trade agreements, alongside the talks about an 
agreement among South Korea, China, and Japan. If the latter 
is not aimed at the formation of a single common market but 
is seen to be an opportunity to move forward with dialogue 
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and cooperation, negotiations could start soon. Under these 
circumstances, the paper by Morrison and Petri, with its call 
for strengthening Asia Pacific economic ties, is timely.
I agree with the authors’ emphasis on APEC. APEC has 
established a vision in which the advanced member countries 
will liberalize trade and investment by 2010 and the develo-
ping countries will do so by 2020. The current consensus, 
however, is that this vision will not materialize. The reason is 
that APEC’s initiatives have, by and large, failed. If the dream 
of Asia Pacific economic integration through APEC is to be 
achieved, the credibility of APEC has to be restored. The aim 
of Asia Pacific economic integration has to be reaffirmed, 
and the Busan Roadmap produced by the 2005 meeting has 
to be revisited.
The public diplomacy mentioned by the authors can be 
achieved in part through different bodies within APEC. The 
APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) can reflect business 
interests, while the APEC Study Center can provide academic 
input. Other organizations, such as the Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council (PECC) and Pacific Basin Economic 
Cooperation (PBEC), need to be further activated, with the 
United States taking on a bigger role. 
There are many obstacles along the road to economic inte-
gration, but the outlook is much brighter today than it was at 
the first APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in 1993. Since then, 
many reciprocal FTAs have been concluded or are being nego-
tiated within APEC. Many members believe that an APEC-wide 
FTA has to be considered, just to avoid the entanglements of a 
«spaghetti noodle» result. If more flexible terms are offered to 
developing countries, an APEC FTA is not necessarily impos-
sible. It would be beneficial not only to the United States but 
also to East Asia. Now is the time for the leaders of the APEC 
member countries to realize the importance of APEC.
Renewing or Reinventing the Pacific Partnership?
PeTer DrysDale, Profesor Emérito y Director del Departamen-
to de Investigación Económica para Asia oriental, ex Director 
Ejecutivo del Australia-Japan Research Centre.
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Renewal of America’s partnership with Asia was never 
more important than it is today. But the scale and structure 
of the changes that are taking place in Asia require more than 
trying to restore an old order, however well it served Ameri-
can and global interests over the past six decades. Arguably 
reinvention not renewal of America’s relations with Asia alone 
will suffice.
The changes that call for a radically new approach are de-
picted to some extent in the figures that accompany Morrison 
and Petri’s essay. But those figures are a modest statement of 
the size of what is going on. It may be reassuring to measure 
the changing weight of the Asian economy in 2020 at current 
exchange rates. That hardly makes much sense, however, if 
you know that the adjustment to China’s massive growth 
will force significant appreciation of the Chinese exchange 
rate, not now but certainly and inexorably over the next 10 
or 15 years. The true size of the Asian economy in 2020 can 
be more closely approximated by measuring in purchasing 
power parity rather than the current exchange rate. Currency 
appreciation alone, even at its present rate, will nearly double 
the value of Chinese output over this period. By 2020 East 
Asia’s economy will likely be bigger than North America’s, 
conservatively accounting for 36 percent of world output 
compared with an American share just under 20 percent.
China’s economic rise and integral role in the continu-
ing rise of Asia are just part of the sweeping changes taking 
place in America’s relations with Asia. The impact on politics, 
security, the environment, and every dimension of America’s 
international affairs is structural and fundamental, not just 
incremental. This is a phenomenon without precedent in 
America’s experience and history as «a rising power.» If it 
is to be managed with any degree of success, it will require 
entirely new ways of thinking, most especially in America, 
about America’s and Asia’s places in the world.
There are powerful political as well as economic reasons 
why the institutionalization of regional arrangements in East 
Asia will be so important in the years immediately ahead. The 
intensity of intraregional economic relations that is projected 
in East Asia cannot be secured without a confident political 
framework. The strategic context in which the region now 
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has to shape its political relations with the world has changed 
dramatically since the end of the Cold War.
The Cold War period was characterized by a stable alliance 
framework. But that system no longer exists, and no similarly 
stable system has yet replaced it. In the post-Cold War period, 
friends and enemies are not clearly identifiable. Strategic and 
economic interests compete for attention. And the rise of new 
economic powers such as China is not automatically accom-
modated within established security structures. Attention to 
what America needs to do about this is at best diverted by 
other issues or is at worst in disarray.
There are three broad options that can be now contem-
plated for the political and security system of East Asia and 
the Pacific: hegemonic power and order; the reemergence of a 
power balance; or the construction of a new concord of powers 
in East Asian and Pacific affairs. However much some might 
hanker after it, hegemonic power is in retreat. Moreover, any 
system that relies on power balance alone in the East Asian 
and Pacific theater is likely to see Japan and the rest of East 
Asia straddling their two most important relationships in the 
region — the relationship with China and the relationship 
with the United States — in some critical circumstance at great 
cost to themselves and to the region. The strategic focus must 
clearly be on constructing an effective and durable concord 
of powers in the region.
The East Asian economic cooperation structures already 
in place are the first crucial, if tentative, steps in building a 
durable concord among powers in the region. If adequately 
reinforced, East Asian economic arrangements can be effec-
tive in mollifying the political tensions and security concerns 
emerging from the rise of China over the years ahead.
Based on solid economic and political arrangements within 
East Asia, a broader concord can then be built to secure 
the constructive engagement of America. The challenge for 
both East Asia and America, then, is to develop a strategy 
that embeds the structures of East Asian cooperation within 
transregional cooperation arrangements such as APEC, as 
Morrison and Petri suggest.
No one in America or Asia has yet put the effort into 
defining a strategy to serve this purpose. The concept that 
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must be developed is a regional architecture for Asia and the 
Pacific, organized around both the established and the rising 
powers.
It is more than timely to invite the East-West Dialogue to 
continue to define cooperative ways forward and a strategy 
that will serve both America’s and Asia’s interests better than 
any that are presently in contemplation.
Building a Mutually Indispensable U.S.-Asia Bond
shen Dingli, Director del Centro de Estudios de América, 
Decano Ejecutivo del Instituto de Asuntos Internacionales, 
Universidad de Fudan, República Popular China.
The present-day quest for productivity and profit, espe-
cially through manufacturing, has led players around the globe 
to find efficient ways to trade their strengths. China and India 
are seeking capital, technology, and markets in the West. The 
West in turn is outsourcing some of its labor needs, to take 
advantage of low costs in Asia. In the globalizing economy, 
both America and major Asian countries are relying on mu-
tually beneficial pragmatism rather than potentially divisive 
ideology.
This growing economic interdependence is not only ben-
eficial to all parties but also strengthens the chances of peace 
in the Asia Pacific region. At the same time, the center of 
economic gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, 
and especially to East Asia. Projections show that China has a 
strong chance to overtake America in the next two decades in 
terms of economic output. Projections using purchasing power 
parity give an even earlier date. India may have a similar but 
more distant chance by mid-century. Obviously, these chal-
lenges, together with many questions about how to cope with 
them, give American policymakers a lot to ponder.
The inaugural essay of the East-West Dialogue by Charles 
E. Morrison and Peter A. Petri addresses the U.S. response 
to the rise of China, India, and other Asian economies and 
observes that America must be firmly established as an at-
tractive model and trusted partner for Asia. The authors 
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propose a threefold approach for the United States to renew 
its partnership with Asia: strategic planning, regional institu-
tions, and public diplomacy. In their view, these elements can 
be woven into a new fabric of peaceful, joint leadership for 
the world economy.
Above all is the vision that the United States must stay 
in Asia and interact constructively with its Asian partners. 
Intra-Asian ties have to be strengthened, and there is a need 
for action to promote U.S.-Asian multilateral collaboration. 
We do not have to look far to find reasons why progress has 
been slow. Factors that immediately come to mind are Asia’s 
political and cultural diversity, and the polarization lingering 
from historical conflicts, in part still reflected by America’s 
current alliances in the region.
Morrison and Petri argue for a revitalization of the U.S. 
partnership with Asia through the two-pronged approach. 
They argue for supporting regional integration, and also 
cooperation within a trans-Pacific context, in which America 
participates more directly. From the viewpoint of strategic 
planning, now that the Six Party Talks have achieved their 
initial objective and plutonium facilities of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) are shutting down, 
the time is gradually becoming right to develop a genuine 
security dialogue and confidence-building mechanism among 
the nations of Northeast Asia.
At the same time, the United States has a unique opportu-
nity to engage Beijing, Tokyo, and New Delhi constructively. 
As the authors point out, U.S. ties with China, Japan, and 
India are now at a historical high point. The United States 
would benefit most by shifting away from the old concept of 
checks and balances and, instead, helping to forge a regional 
partnership among the three large Asian powers and taking 
a leadership role in this process. The effort to achieve a more 
balanced relationship among them and to nurture mutual ac-
commodations needs America’s active participation and will 
help to keep the United States firmly engaged in the region.
Morrison and Petri have defined APEC as the centerpiece 
of America’s multilateral relationship with Asia, and APEC 
does indeed need «realistic goals leading to successes.» It will 
not be difficult to identify problems for APEC to work on, 
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but these problems must be of mutual interest to both sides 
of the Pacific. During the next 10 years, America’s output 
and share of world wealth will still be ahead of Asia’s, giv-
ing the United States sizable leverage to initiate multilateral 
negotiations that will deliver tangible outcomes. As long as 
America can help to generate public goods for Asia in a timely 
way, leadership from Washington will remain appealing to 
America’s partners in Asia.
